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Purpose and Significance of Paper
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether China’s decade of rapid growth in home
prices represents a gigantic housing bubble. The United States Housing meltdown in
2006-07 triggered a financial crisis that progressed into the worst recession since the
Great Depression. Six years later, the United States is still recovering from the impact,
and home prices have just begun to reach pre-crisis levels. There are still millions of
"shadow" inventory- underwater mortgages, modified mortgages, and delinquent
mortgages- in the markets. As of January 2014, CoreLogic estimates that there are 2.47
million loans that are 90 days or more past due or already in foreclosure (CoreLogic,
2014). While this is the lowest level since 2008 and 23% below 2013 levels, it will take
time for the market to fully absorb this shadow supply (CoreLogic, 2014).
In contrast, China withstood the turmoil with a $586 billion economic stimulus package
in 2008 invested in housing, infrastructure, transportation, disaster rebuilding, tax cuts,
and finance. The stimulus package was welcomed by world leaders who believed that by
boosting the Chinese economy, China would simultaneously help stabilize the world
economy. Upon announcement of the fiscal stimulus, markets around the world jumped.
However, more recently there have been concerns that Chinese banks have loosened
their lending standards as a result of the stimulus, which could lead to excessive lending
to home purchasers and even more rapidly rising prices. These loosened lending
standards may lead to an increase in nonperforming loans. If the unjustified high prices
collapse, would the Chinese government also perform a bailout, similar to the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008? Through this act, the United States
government had authorized the U.S. Treasury to buy risky and nonperforming debt
from various lending institution and infused $250 billion into the American banking
system (US Federal Government). Despite concerns of the Chinese facing similar risks
that pre-recession America faced, the likelihood of this happening is low, mainly due to
the high equity levels that the Chinese tend to put into their homes relative to the rest of
the world. There is an equity buffer in the Chinese market to withstand a drop in prices.
It is unlikely that the Chinese government will allow prices to drop so much that it eats
into the equity before implementing measures, as seen by the two decades of effective
housing policy measures.
Perhaps what is much more concerning is the fact that residential investment accounts
for 1/6th of China’s economic growth (World Bank). China’s GDP growth is already
slowest in the past two decades. The direct and indirect effects on the economy outside
of the banking system would be tremendous. While China continues to be the world’s
largest exporter, China’s government is attempting to move the country away from
reliance on state-led industry and exports toward larger domestic consumption,
especially as the rising wages and appreciating Renminbi have been hindering the
3

nation’s export growth (Silk, 2014). With the majority of the Chinese people's money
invested in real estate, even if there is enough equity in the Chinese mortgage loans, the
bursting of a housing bubble would significantly impact Chinese people's internal
consumption power and slow down the economy even further. A significant slowdown
in China, being the second largest global economy and a prime driver of the world
economy, could trigger a downward spiral for the rest of the world.
Percentage GDP Growth of China and other countries

Source: World Bank

Therefore, the crucial issue is whether there are housing bubbles in major cities
throughout the country that are about to burst. China has experienced extraordinary
growth in the housing market during the past decade, which has been accompanied by
substantial increases in residential property prices. As a result, owning a home has
become increasingly less affordable for most working families, despite government's
efforts in implementing policies and programs that support homeownership. The
government has imposed a long string of housing policy measures to slow home price
increase, aiming to curb property speculation and improve affordability. While these
policies have been effective to a certain extent, prices only seem to be temporarily
suppressed. Furthermore, another thing of concern would be the rent levels in these
cities. Rents can be an indicator of a bubble, and rents in China have not grown nearly
as quickly as sales have. In fact, in Beijing and Shanghai, rent levels are well below 2008
levels (Fung, 2014).
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Major Housing Reforms
Setting the Private Residential Real Estate Sector in Motion
From founding of People’s Republic of China to 1978, all land was publicly owned. There
was a welfare system in place, in which government provided low-cost but also lowquality accommodations. In 1988, the Chinese Constitution was amended to allow land
transactions. In March 1998, the Communist party announced new system to encourage
people to purchase their homes, using one-time subsidies and mortgage incentives. In
1994, the government implemented a rent reform, allowed the sales of public housing,
introducing concepts of “economically affordable houses” and “commodity houses”. In
August 1999, it was declared that any residential unit built after January 1, 1999 was to
be bought, not allocated by the government. After the housing reform, the land market
was better regulated and property rights better protected. (McKinsey Global Institute,
2009)

Land market Better Regulated
China took major steps to improve regulation of its land market through the 1) abolition
of private transfer of land titles after August 2004 and 2) requirements that all sites sold
by local governments must through a public listing process with transaction prices
disclosed. The introduction of the new rule provided better transparency. (Li, 2013)

Property Rights Better protected
To protect the legal rights of owners, the National People’s Congress voted in August
1007 to add a new clause to the General Principles of the Law on Management of Urban
Real Estate. The clause aims to protect the legal rights of owners and to guarantee the
residence conditions of private owners after resettlement. The clause allows residential
land use right scan to be automatically renewed upon expiration. (Li, 2013)

Current Status of Chinese Property Market
Residential Property Market Segmentation
These are the main types of residential properties in China. Developers mainly focus on
the upper segments of the market.
1) Commodity Houses/ Private Housing
Commodity houses are purchased and rented at market prices. In 2010,
municipal governments limited purchase of homes by non-residents to curtail
speculation. There are concerns that this may lead to distortion of prices. This is
the main focus for property developers. Property titles are transferable. Private
housing segment has been gaining market share, accounting for 35% of total
supply in 2012 (Li, 2013).
2) Economic Housing
5

Economically affordable houses are set by the government to be at no more than
3 - 5% above total construction costs (China Index Institute, 2012). To qualify,
households must have “hukou” and other requirements. Once purchased, cannot
be sold for another 5 years. The market share of economically affordable houses
has been declining sharply (See graph below). Priced at 50-70% discount below
private housing prices, these used to be built by state-owned real estate
enterprises, targeted at Middle-income families with residency (Li, 2013). These
properties are re-saleable after 5 years.
3) Low-rent Housing
Initially built by the government, these are meant for low-income families that
cannot afford a house. Units are allotted to families and are non-tradable.
4) Public Rental Housing
Newly introduced in 2007-08, public rental housing units is targeted at the
population working in the major cities but do not have residency (hukou). These
are also meant for families with income constraints but not eligible to apply for
economic and low-rent housing.
5) Shanty-town Resettlement
Started in 2007 for the resettlement needs of shanty-town occupants. These are
not re-saleable.

Share of Economically Affordable Housing in China
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Source: China National Bureau of Statistics

Policy Intervention
Policy intervention by the Chinese government dates as far back as 2003. The industry was
highly under-regulated prior to these policies. Demand side tightening measures are more
common adopted, because the Central government has limited control over housing supply due
to the highly fragmented nature of industry. After the 2008 financial crisis, the government
implemented monetary easing such as mortgage rate cuts, and incentives were provided by local
governments for home purchases, such as with ranting of residency status in cities.
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Supply-side restrictive measures
• Breaking down large sites into smaller sites during land sale to increase asset turnover
and completion
• Idle Land Policy (confiscating land set idle for over two years)
• Land Appreciation Tax
• Development of affordable homes
• Increasing supply of small units
Demand-side restrictive measures
• Increasing deed tax on luxury properties
• Forbidding resale of units before completion
• Capital Gain Tax on resale of units within two – five years of purchase
• Price caps on primary construction launches
• Real Estate Tax in Shanghai and Chongqing
• House Purchase Restrictions
Credit measures targeting at real estate
• Project LTV limited at 65%
• LTV limit of residential mortgages across first, second, and third –time home buyers

Rising Income Level and High Savings Rate
Two main factors make the Chinese consumer market stand out: 1) a rapidly rising per
capita income level and 2) a high savings rate. According to Boston Consulting Group,
China continues to have the highest percentage increase in assets under management, at
36.8%, boosted by strong economic growth and appreciation of Renminbi. Per-capita
disposable income and population of middle class expected to continue to increase,
though at a slower pace. (Milkin Institute) Chinese households own about $3.2 trillion
in financial wealth, which is approximately 44% of the wealth of Asia-Pacific excluding
Japan. Additionally, 64% of the assets are cash holdings. (Xu L. J., 2012)
National savings rate are important for the long-run health of economies. China has a
National Savings Rate savings rate of 49.5% of GDP, which is ranked top 5 in the world
and first amongst commodity-importing countries. This high savings rate can help the
nation withstand a deterioration in global financing conditions. (Bank of America
Private Wealth Management, 2012)
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National savers: The Top 10 Highest Savings Rates Countries in 2012

Source: International Monetary Fund as of April 2013

High Homeownership Rate
As a result, homeownership rate is very high in China. Homeownership was at 90% in
2012, which is 6th highest in the world. This can be compared to the United States
homeownership rate, which has been fluctuating around 65%. It is believed that the
high homeownership rate of the Chinese is due to a mix of cultural influences and
limited investing opportunities for the Chinese. The Chinese government limits the
amount of Chinese money invested abroad, and the Chinese stock markets are high in
volatility. As the Chinese citizens' net wealth grew exponentially in the past decade,
many Chinese view investing in real estate as the single most safe and feasible way to
invest their money.
Homeownership in the United States
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Top Homeownership Rates in the World
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Source: Barclay's Research, Xinhua English News

Leverage in the System
In terms of financing of homes, Chinese homeowners take on very low leverage. Even
without taking into consideration housing price growth, the Loan-to-Value (LTV) ratio
is extremely low when compared to other nations. The average LTV ratio is around 21 30%. It is believed that the low leverage levels is due to the high savings rate of the
nation (49.5% of GDP) and ceilings put on LTVs by the Housing Provident Fund.
Additionally, most home loans in China are variable-rate mortgages, which can be
concerning especially with the mortgage rates on the rise. The Chinese housing finance
system is mainly comprised of 1) the Housing Provident Fund lending, and 2)
private sector mortgage lending.
Average Interest Rates on Home Mortgages

Source: Standard Chartered bank (2013)
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1) Housing Provident Fund (住房工資金)
The Chinese has a system called the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) in place to curfew
the amount of debt one can take on. The HPF is a defined contribution pension, of
which contribution come from both employers and employees. Monthly contribution
from both sides should be at least 5% of the employees' monthly salary, and capped at
20%. Each city has its own HPF Management center. Additionally, the max loan amount
is Rmb 0.4 mn for individual and Rmb 0.8 mn for a household. The allowable loan
amount is set at 15 – 25x HPF account amount. The max LTV for small unit (<90 square
meters) is 80%, and the max LTV for a larger unit larger unit (>90 square meters) is
70%. (Housing Finance Network, 2013)
2) Private Sector Mortgage
Private sector is the main source of home finance, accounting for 82% of total home
mortgages last year (Li, 2013). China’s private sector mortgage grew 173 times since
1998, now the second largest Asia-Pacific market (US $1.16 trillion) after Japan (US
$1.29 trillion) (Housing Finance Network, 2013).
China Mortgage Loan LTV Limits

China Mortgage Loan Rates

Source: PBoC, J.P. Morgan Equity Research

Just what is a Bubble?
Asset bubbles have been the cause of many economic recessions, but is there a way to
empirically spot the bubble before it bursts? In New York Times, Yale economist Robert
Shiller listed factors giving rise to a bubble. He argued that a bubble is a form of
"psychological malfunction", and below is a checklist to determine if there is an asset
bubble. (Shiller, 2010)
1) Sharp increases in the price of an asset
2) Great public excitement about said increases
3) An accompanying media frenzy
4) Stories of people earning a lot of money, causing envy among people who aren’t
5) Growing interest in the asset class among the general public
10

6) “New era” theories justify unprecedented price increases
7) A decline in lending standards
All of the above have been seen in China's major cities. Determinants of Home prices
include fundamentals of housing supply and demand (Glindro et al., 2005). Another
factor (which arguably can be categorized as a fundamental) is government support and
policies (Huang, 2004). As seen from the graph below from JP Morgan Asia Research,
China's property market represents a highly regulated industry, and the government has
significant impact on the property index. Similarly, Xu and Chen found in a paper
published in 2010 that monetary policy clearly accelerated home price growth, while
speculative investment inflow did not have a significant impact on home price growth
after controlling for money supply growth (Xu and Chen, 2010).

JP Morgan China Property index
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So, Is There a Bubble?
The possibility of a real estate bubble in China is hardly a trivial matter, and much
research have already been done. There are mixed results from papers written so far on
this issue. Most agree that there is a higher chance of a bubble existing in megametropolitan cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. Ahuja and colleagues in 2010 found
that there is lack of evidence of a nationwide housing bubble, but some studies find
overpricing may exist in mega-metropolitan areas such as Beijing, Shanghai, and
Chongqing (Ahuja et al, 2010). In a paper by Wu, Gyourko, and Deng in 2010, it was
stated that “although we could not provide a definitive test with our limited
data…multiple parts of evidence…suggest the potential for substantial mispricing in
Beijing and other Chinese housing markets…The magnitude of the increase in land
values over the past 2 – 3 years in particular in Beijing is unprecedented to our
knowledge” (Wu, Gyourko, & Deng, 2010). In 2011, Wall Street Journal published an
article titled “The Great Property Bubble of China May Be Popping”, suggesting that
after years of housing prices gone wild, prices are finally heading downwards (Davis,
2011). World Bank economists warned in press conferences that a downturn in property
prices was among the biggest economic risks that China faces. While there was a
slowdown in the property markets in 2010-2011, especially due to government’s efforts
to rein in rising residential property prices and create a soft landing, such was with
abovementioned demand and supply restraints. However, prices have only continued
escalating upwards since 2011.

Escalating Land Prices
China’s official data from the National Bureau of Statistics website is haunted by
controversy, with widespread doubts about its accuracy. For example, independent
estimates of China’s GDP growth suggest that the official data might be exaggerated. But
the one thing we can be certain of are the escalating land prices in China (Orlik, 2011).
The government introduced in 2004 that all sites sold by local governments must go
through a public listing process, enabling researchers to obtain public data on land
prices. The Chinese National hedonic Land Price Index (CRLPI), an index developed by
Joseph Gyourko, Jing Wu, and Yongheng Deng in 2012, tracks the real land prices of 35
city markets in China. Since the first quarter of 2004, real land prices have increased by
approximately 200%. There was prices surge just before the recession and dropped
during the global financial crisis. Prices quickly picked up after the 2008 stimulus was
implemented. This price escalation continued until 2011 when the stimulus came off as
the government once again worry about the overpriced property values and affordability
of homes. Similarly for city-wide data, we see the common trend of rapidly rising land
prices in each city.
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Urbanization remains a key driver of demand
What is the cause of the escalating prices? The abovementioned high homeownership
rate, high savings rate, and high income growth are all factors. Arguably the most
important factor in the rapidly rising prices of homes is urbanization, which is the main
demand driver for residential houses. Demand curve is very clearly shifting outwards
due to urbanization and strong economic fundamentals. In fact, urban population of
China is expected to increase by 26% over the next decade (Economic Intelligence Unit).
This is caused by burgeoning economic success and rapidly rising standard of living. In
2011, China's urban population has already exceeded 50 % of its total population for the
first time, meaning that over half of China now lives in major cities. In fact, McKinsey
Global Institute found that if current trend holds, nearly 1 billion people will live in
urban centers by 2025. As seen in the graph below by the Reserve Bank of Australia,
urbanization rate is predicted to reach 75% of total Chinese population by 2040.

Urbanization Rate, projected by Reserve Bank of Australia

Source: United Nations, Reserve Bank of Australia
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China Map: Population Size and Urbanization Rate by Provinces and Municipalities

Source: JP Morgan Asia Pacific Research

Determining the supply curve: Flat or Steep?
Now that we've established with evidence the escalating prices and high demand of the
Chinese property market, the shape of the supply curve in China can help determine
whether there is a housing bubble in China's major cities. To justify the prices, we would
hope that the supply curve slopes upwards instead of laying flat. There was a total of 3.4
billion square meter of floor space built in China in 2012 (CEIC). Arguably, the scale of
construction was necessary to house 20 million annual increase in urban population.
The question is not that whether prices should increase, but by how much is reasonable?
It is impossible to perform a detailed econometrics study due to limited readily available
data on the market cycles in China for analysis. Due to the limitations, this study
performs a "back-of-the-envelope" analysis to determine whether supply might be
outstripping demand.
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Methodology
To arrive at a reliable framework to model supply and demand, we used official data
from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and formulated the following
assumptions. We have come up with a framework to calculate supply and demand in
terms of number of units. We collected both national and city data.

CALCULATION OF DEMAND (IN UNITS)
•

Average Number of Households
The average number of households represents an estimate of housing demand,
because household formation represents home buyers. The high homeownership
rate in China suggests that most of the household formation translates to owners
rather than renters. This data can be found readily available from NBS or from
dividing total population with the average persons per household.
Associate Professor of Community and Regional Planning at Iowa State
University suggests adding a vacancy rate percentage to the demand estimate.
The idea is that an efficient housing market should offer prospective buyers a
variety of choices of units so they might choose which one, if any, best suits their
needs. (Woods & Barta, 2000)
CALCULATION OF SUPPLY (IN UNITS)

•

•

•

Total Floor Space
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 =
× 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
Average Flat Size
𝐴𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
=
×
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
Total Units
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆⁄𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀/
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈
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Nation-Wide Data
We multiplied China’s Urban Population with Floor Space per Capita in Urban China.
Total Floor Space is obtained by subtracting estimated demolitions from the resulting
numbers. Average Flat Size was obtained by multiplying Average National Household
Size with Floor Space per Capita. Total units was obtained by dividing Total Floor Space
with the Average Flat Size. This is our measure of housing supply. Housing demand is
measured by average number of households.
DEMOLITIONS
To estimate demolitions, we gathered data from State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council. According to the commission, there
was a total of 1.8 billion square meters of floor space demolished between 2008 and
2010. This implies an annual demolition rate of at least 4.5%. However, stock of
dilapidated residential buildings should gradually decline as buildings are replaced with
higher-quality construction. Furthermore, expropriation process is beginning to cost
more due to enforcement of property rights (Henderson, 2009), which also slows down
demolition rate. These numbers are in line with the depreciation rate from Chinese
national accounts with average building life span of 50 years. Hence, we produced the
following demolition rate chart, which will be subtracted from total floor space.

17

URBAN CHINA DATA

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Australia Reserve Bank, and “Sustaining China’s
Economic Growth after the Global Financial Crisis” (Lardy)

18

Supply vs. Demand in Urban China (1996 – 2012)
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Change in Supply and Demand (1996 – 2012)
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We see that the average annual increase is 5.48% for supply but only 3.62% for demand.
It may be possible that the nation started out with an incredible amount of supply
shortage, but the data suggests that supply seems to be outstripping demand at the
national level currently. Furthermore, Total Residential Floor Space (8.28%) is growing
at a much faster pace than Total Units (5.48%). This is because while average household
size has shrunk from 3.7 persons per household in 1996 to 3.02 persons per household
in 2012, the average size of a residential flat in urban China has increased from 63
square meters in 1996 to 99 square meters in 2012. This led to a 193% increase in floor
area per capita since 1996.
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City-level Data
Understanding that real estate markets are local, looking only at national data would be
insufficient in trying to answer the question of whether there are housing bubbles in
China’s cities. We analyzed data from 10 major cities in China: Beijing, Shanghai,
Chongqing, Tianjin, Guangzhou, Nanjing, Wuhan, Dalian, Chengdu, and Hangzhou. We
calculated total residential floor space for each city for a measure of housing supply.
However, we had some doubts regarding the accuracy of the data for Number of
Households at the city-level from National Bureau of Statistics. Official numbers reveal
that number of households in many of the 10 cities did not increase much or at all. For
example, number of households in Guangzhou, Dalian, Wuhan, and Chengdu remained
constant since 1995 according to official numbers. Due to the high urbanization trends
over the past two decades, we know that this simply cannot be true. This
misrepresentation might be a result of statistics only the Huji (戶籍) system. The
Chinese relies on hukous ( 戶 口 ), or residential permits, to record the number of
households in a city; however, there are many city residents holding illegal hukous, and
these people are not reflected in the statistics. Due to limitations of the data from
National Bureau of Statistics, we were unable to perform the precise demand vs. supply
analysis in terms of number of flats at the city level. Nevertheless, we use Beijing as an
example for city-level data, because the official numbers reflect a slightly more accurate
picture of how much number of households have risen over the years, increasing 460%
since 1995.
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BEIJING DATA
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Supply vs. Demand in Beijing (2005 - 2012)
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Data from NBS does not reach as far back for city-level data. We were able to calculate
data for supply from 2005 – 2009. Although the data for number of households is
staggered, the line regression provides an estimate for household demand from 1995 –
2012. Beijing has an average annual increase of 6.6% in supply, which is higher than the
estimate for Urban China. On the demand side, we see an incredible average annual
increase of 14.5% in number of households. This suggests that demand is exceeding
supply at the Beijing city-level. Similar to national data, Total Residential Floor Space
(19.7%) is growing at a much faster pace than Total Units (6.6%). This is because while
average household size has shrunk from 3.1 persons per household in 1996 to 2.5
persons per household in 2012, the average size of a residential flat in urban China has
been increasing at approximately 6 square meters per year. Hence, floor space per
capita has been increasing at around 14% per year. However, the above information
should to be taken with a grain of salt, as we only have 5 years of data for supply.
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Conclusions
The landscape of China's property markets have changed drastically since the successful
privatization of the housing sector in the 1990s. However, the years of extraordinary
pricing growth give rise to concerns that pricing bubbles have formed in some cities. The
collapse of these bubbles would lead to slowdown of the nation and potentially the
global economy as well.
To combat large bubbles in cities, Chinese policy makers have implemented a series of
corrective measures after 2008 to ensure a “soft landing”. Required reserve ratios for
banks have increased 12 times in 2010-11, and interest rates at People’s Bank of China
have been increased to curtail housing mortgages. Facing a tightening credit market,
real estate developers have begun to produce fewer units. Yet, prices continue to escalate.
To better combat housing bubbles, the Milkin Institute suggests that property taxes
should be better implemented in addition to the monetary policy instruments. Crowe et
al. (2011) states that “higher rates of property taxation can help limit housing booms as
well as short-run volatility around an upward trend in prices.” However, China’s
property tax reform faces enormous challenges including resistance from influential
interest groups. Successful establishment of a property tax as a major revenue source
requires not only strong assessment techniques and tax design but also political
determination and administrative reform.
In aggregate at the nation-level, supply seems to be exceeding demand with a higher
amount of supply built each year than demanded from urbanization. Assuming data
from National Bureau of Statistics is accurate, the high and escalating prices in China
seem to be unjustified. Even if the cities had started with a large shortage of supply, we
should have expected some slowdown in prices according to these trends. Prices do not
necessarily have to fall, but an increase of 6-15% a year suggests a much stronger
demand than supply, which is not the case at the national level.
However, at the city-level, Beijing seems to be experiencing the opposite. With an a
average annual increase of 6.6% in total residential units and an average annual increase
of 14.5% in number of households, data suggest that demand is exceeding supply in
Beijing. However, city-level data analysis is limited by lack of supply data pre 2005 and
post 2012. With only 5 years of data for supply, we should take the results with a grain of
salt. Due to inaccurate data for number of households, we could not perform a detailed
supply versus demand analysis on the city-level data for the 9 other cities. However, we
were able to calculate Total Residential Floor Space for the cities. It is evident through
the graphs that the supply has been steadily increasing in each of the 10 major cities
analyzed.
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It seems that we are not the only ones realizing that the rising prices of residential prices
in China's cities might be reaching a plateau. Big real estate players in China have begun
to realize that the Chinese property market appears to be softening along with the rest of
the country's economy. According to Cushman & Wakefield Research, the average yields
for property transactions in Beijing has declined from 12.5% in 2004 to 6% in 2013.
Similarly, property prices in Shanghai used to see average yields of 9% in 2004, which
has decreased to 6% in 2013. Those who think that values have peaked have cut back on
Chinese investing and are looking abroad to invest in foreign estates (Fung, 2014).
However, not all developers think this way. For every transaction, there is both a buyer
and a seller. Where smaller cities in China are facing swelling inventories and falling
prices, Beijing is still seeing major constructions where investors believe the market is
healthy and prices justified by fundamentals.
Despite the findings of this study, our view on the Chinese housing market is still
cautiously positive. China has several factors in place that the US did not have during
the housing meltdown in 2008. The Chinese government requires high down payments
and limits the LTV on property purchases. Most of the homeowners have enough equity
in their properties to withstand a price drop. Essentially, China has accumulated a large
enough cushion against the possibility of a crash in their housing markets. Furthermore,
the Chinese government's debt level is low at approximately 40% of GDP, compared to
92% in the United States (Li, 2013). China could also call in the $3 trillion in foreign
exchange reserves and $700 billion in required reserves in People's Bank of China when
they do need it. Consequently, China is arguably less vulnerable to a liquidity crunch
than most other nations.
Therefore, while our study suggests that supply might be exceeding demand at the
national level, a financial crisis the magnitude of the US Housing Crisis of 2006-2008 is
unlikely to occur. However, the Chinese will face direct effects of the reduced residential
investments as developers go bankrupt and mortgages default. The phenomenon of
ghost cities will be more prevalent. The reduced property investments will have spillover
effects in industries such as rugs, lamps, and lightning fixtures. We can also expect new
construction to drop to very low levels. While China is more protected than U.S. was
from the bursting of property bubbles, we do not need a financial crisis to happen for
this to be important to China and the rest of the world.
Lastly, it is essential for China to compile consistent home price indices at both the local
and national level. Regulators of China should improve the data collection practices to
better access the effectiveness of current housing policies and to spot the early signs of a
housing bubble.
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